Amicus Briefs

Issue: Should Pennsylvania recognize a novel cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud when it would unnecessarily burden Pennsylvania businesses and Harm Pennsylvania Consumers?

This case was filed in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. PCCJR urges the court to recognize US Supreme Court precedent and reject the concept of jurisdiction by virtue of registering to do business in Pennsylvania.

At issue:

Unfair competition and Puntive damage ratio calculations.

The brief requests a reargument before an en banc panel of the Superior Court to overturn a decision of a Superior Court panel. The Court’s opinion in Spencer v Johnson concluded that the Fair Share Act’s provision apportioning damages based on the percentage of a defendant’s fault does not apply unless the plaintiff in the case is contributorily negligent. The court wrongly concluded that the Fair Share Act does not apply if the plaintiff has zero negligence.

(1) Are claims by the commonwealth, brought on behalf of private landowners against natural gas extractors alleging that the extractors used deceptive, misleading, and unfair tactics in securing natural gas leases from landowners, cognizable under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law? (2) May the commonwealth pursue antitrust remedies under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law? Update: The court agreed with PCCJR's position that the UTPA and CPL does not protect sellers

At issue is the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Medical Liability Venue Statute and Medical Liability Venue Rule. The decision of the Superior Court, while not directly on the merits, leaves the medical liability venue rule and statute standing. The Superior Court’s decision is a victory against allowing venue shopping to return to medical liability cases.

Whether the Superior Court improperly held that a strict liability standard applies to a claim under the “catch-all” provision of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. §§ 201-1, et seq., as amended in 1996, even though the provision expressly requires proof of “fraudulent or deceptive conduct.”

Whether, in this matter of first impression, the Supreme Court should adopt the "enterprise theory" or "single entity" theory of piercing the corporate veil when two or more sister companies operate as a single corporate combine?