

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|----------------------|
| Jennifer Santiago and Samuel |) | |
| Santiago, Ind. and as p.n.g. for |) | |
| Isabella Santiago, a minor, |) | |
| |) | |
| <i>Respondents,</i> |) | |
| |) | No. ____ |
| vs. |) | |
| |) | ELECTRONICALLY FILED |
| Philly Trampoline Park, LLC, I/P/A |) | |
| Sky Zone, D/B/A Sky Zone |) | |
| Trampoline Park D/B/A Sky Zone |) | |
| Philadelphia, Sky Zone Philadelphia, |) | |
| Inc., Sky Zone Trampoline Park |) | |
| A/K/A/ Sky Zone Philadelphia, |) | |
| |) | |
| <i>Petitioners.</i> |) | |

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF *AMICI CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 123 and 531(a) and (b)(1)(iii), Get Air Management, Inc. (“Get Air”); the Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform (“Coalition”); the Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association (“PMA”); and the National Federation of Independent Business, Inc. (“NFIB”) apply for leave to submit the attached brief of *amicus curiae* in support of a petition for allowance of appeal filed by the Sky Zone petitioners in the above captioned matter. In support, *amici* state as follows:

1. Get Air provides management services to Get Air brand name trampoline parks.
2. The Coalition is a statewide, nonpartisan alliance of organizations and individuals representing health care providers, professional and trade associations, businesses, nonprofit entities, taxpayers, and other perspectives. The Coalition is

dedicated to bringing fairness to litigants by elevating awareness of civil justice issues and advocating for reform.

3. PMA seeks to improve the Commonwealth's competitiveness by promoting pro-growth public policies that reduce the cost of creating and keeping jobs in Pennsylvania. PMA has forcefully advocated for civil justice reforms that will bring balance and stability to Pennsylvania's legal system.

4. NFIB's mission is to promote and protect the right of its members to own, operate, and grow their businesses.

5. On March 21, 2023, a panel of the Superior Court issued a precedential opinion on an issue of first impression in the Commonwealth and held that, in a case involving an arbitration agreement signed by a parent on behalf of a minor child who later sued in court, "the parent-child relationship did not empower the signatory parents to waive their minor children's rights to have their claims resolved in a court of law." A copy of the opinion and order is attached at Tab "A."

6. The Sky Zone petitioners filed a petition for allowance of appeal on April 20, 2023.

7. Rule 531(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that "a non-party interested in the questions involved in any matter pending in an appellate court" and "[a]n *amicus curiae* may file a brief (i) during merits briefing; (ii) in support of or against a petition for allowance of appeal, if the *amicus curiae* participated in the underlying proceeding as to which the petition for allowance of appeal seeks review; or (iii) by leave of court."

8. *Amici* request leave to file a brief *amicus curiae* in support of the Sky Zone petitioners.

9. The Court should allow an appeal "when there are special and important reasons therefor," including when a case involves a question of first impression or of substantial public importance. *See* Pa.R.A.P. 1114; Supreme Court IOP § 6.

10. The *amici* have a significant interest in having the Court grant allowance of appeal in this case.

11. This case presents a novel issue of substantial public importance.

12. The Commonwealth has a strong policy favoring arbitrations.

13. Arbitrations provide a simple, informal, and expeditious manner of resolving disputes, including disputes involving minors.

14. A parent or guardian therefore has the authority to bind a minor child to arbitrate a claim instead of suing in the courts of the Commonwealth.

15. The panel's contrary decision degrades the longstanding policy in favor of arbitration, ignores the distinction between agreeing to a forum to resolve disputes *versus* waiving actual claims and engenders legal and practical concerns for the business of *amici*.

16. The panel's decision also implicates public policy considerations that have the potential to materially affect the legal landscape and business climate for *amici*.

17. If permitted to participate as *amici*, the Court will have the benefit of their perspective on these issues as it considers whether to allow an appeal and the merits of this important question.

18. If granted, *amici* request that the attached brief be deemed as filed on the date that petitioners filed their petition for allowance of appeal.

WHEREFORE, *amici* respectfully request that the Court grant its application for leave and accept, as filed, the “BRIEF OF AMICI GET AIR MANAGEMENT, INC.; PENNSYLVANIA COALITION FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM; PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION; and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS, INC. SUPPORTING THE SKY ZONE PETITIONERS” attached to this application at Tab “B.” A proposed form of order is attached at Tab “C.”

April 20, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

GA BIBIKOS LLC

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TAB “A” – OPINION

J-A26009-22

J-A26010-22

2023 PA SUPER 47

JENNIFER SANTIAGO AND SAMUEL SANTIAGO : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PHILLY TRAMPOLINE PARK, LLC I/P/A
SKY ZONE, D/B/A SKY ZONE
TRAMPOLINE PARK D/B/A SKY ZONE
PHILADELPHIA, SKY ZONE
PHILADELPHIA, INC., SKY ZONE
TRAMPOLINE PARK A/K/A SKY ZONE
PHILADELPHIA

Appellants : No. 2615 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): February Term, 2021, No. 021

ALESSANDRA SHULTZ,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS P.N.G. FOR
ROCCO SHULTZ, A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SKY ZONE, LLC

Appellant : No. 664 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 200701660

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

FILED MARCH 21, 2023

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

In these separate appeals, we are tasked with deciding an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania: whether a parent's role as natural guardian entitles the parent to bind a minor child to an arbitration agreement and waive that child's right to seek redress for injuries in a court of law. Answering that question in the negative and concluding that the respective trial courts likewise properly resolved whether the parents' claims were subject to arbitration, we affirm both of the appealed-from orders that ruled upon motions to compel arbitration filed by Appellant, Sky Zone.¹

I. Facts and Procedural History²

A. The Shultz Plaintiffs

In August 2018, Ryan Shultz took two minors, including his son Rocco, to Sky Zone, a Philadelphia trampoline park. In order for the children to use the facilities, Mr. Shultz was required to execute a six-page document entitled "Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk (The Agreement)." Petition to Compel Arbitration, 1/21/21, Exhibit B at 1. In addition to, among other things, recognizing a voluntary assumption of risk, allowing Sky Zone to

¹ In one case, the plaintiffs brought their claims against Philly Trampoline Park, LLC I/P/A Sky Zone, D/B/A Sky Zone Trampoline Park D/B/A Sky Zone Philadelphia, Sky Zone Philadelphia, Inc., and Sky Zone Trampoline Park A/K/A Sky Zone Philadelphia, while in the other, Sky Zone, LLC is the named defendant. For ease of discussion, we refer to the appellants in both cases, who are all represented by the same counsel, as "Sky Zone."

² We derive the underlying facts by accepting as true the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaints and from the record created for adjudication of the motions to compel arbitration.

use the children's' images on social media, agreeing to receive e-mail promotions, and broadly acknowledging "that if I or any of my children are injured in any way, this waiver prevents and prohibits any recovery of money from any Sky Zone related entity," *id.* at 6 (emphasis omitted), the Agreement contained the following arbitration provision:

ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES; TIME LIMIT TO BRING CLAIM

- ☒ I understand that by agreeing to arbitrate any dispute as set forth in this section, I am waiving my right, and the right(s) of the minor child(ren) above, to maintain a lawsuit against SZ and the other Releasees for any and all claims covered by this Agreement. By agreeing to arbitrate, I understand that I will **NOT** have the right to have my claim determined by a jury, and the minor child(ren) above will **NOT** have the right to have claim(s) determined by a jury. Reciprocally, SZ and the other Releasees waive their right to maintain a lawsuit against me and the minor child(ren) above for any and all claims covered by this Agreement, and they will not have the right to have their claim(s) determined by a jury. **ANY DISPUTE, CLAIM OR CONTROVERSY ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO MY OR THE CHILD'S ACCESS TO AND/OR USE OF THE SKY ZONE PREMISES AND/OR ITS EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OR APPLICABILITY OF THIS AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE, SHALL BE BROUGHT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF ITS ACCRUAL (i.e., the date of the alleged injury) AND BE DETERMINED BY ARBITRATION IN THE COUNTY OF THE SKY ZONE FACILITY, PENNSYLVANIA, BEFORE ONE ARBITRATOR. THE ARBITRATION SHALL BE ADMINISTERED BY JAMS PURSUANT TO ITS RULE 16.1 EXPEDITED ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES. JUDGMENT ON THE AWARD MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT HAVING JURISDICTION. THIS CLAUSE SHALL NOT PRECLUDE PARTIES FROM SEEKING PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN AID OF ARBITRATION FROM A COURT OF APPROPRIATE JURISDICTION.** This Agreement shall be governed by, construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, without regard to choice of law principles. Notwithstanding the provision with respect to

the applicable substantive law, any arbitration conducted pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C., Sec. 1-16). I understand and acknowledge that the JAMS Arbitration Rules to which I agree are available online for my review at jamsadr.com, and include JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures; Rule 16.1 Expedited Procedures; and, Policy On Consumer Minimum Standards Of Procedural Fairness.

Id. at 3-4 (emphases in original). Mr. Shultz identified Rocco as one of the minor participants in the Sky Zone activities, and electronically executed the Agreement below the following provision:

By signing below, I represent and warrant that I am the parent, legal guardian, or power-of-attorney of the above listed Child(ren) and have the authority to execute this Agreement on his/her or their behalf and to act on his/her or their behalf. I have read each paragraph in this document and I and they agree to be bound by the terms stated therein, including the release of liability contained therein. I further agree to indemnify and hold harmless the Releasees from any and all claims which are brought by or on behalf of this or these minor Child or Children, or any of them, which are in any way connected with, arise out of, or result from their use of the Sky Zone Facility. I am 18 years of age or older. I am entering this agreement on behalf of myself, my spouse or domestic partner, the Child, and our respective and/or collective issue, parents, siblings, heirs, assigns, personal representatives, estate(s), and anyone else who can claim by or through such person or persons (collectively, the "Releasing Parties").

Id. at 5-6. While utilizing the facilities, five-year-old Rocco was injured when an older, larger child jumped on the same trampoline as Rocco. **See** Complaint, 7/24/20, at ¶ 8.

On July 24, 2020, Alessandra Shultz, who is Rocco's mother, filed a complaint in her own right and on behalf of Rocco in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, seeking personal injury damages related to

Rocco's injury and for Ms. Shultz to recover the costs of his medical treatment. Sky Zone filed a petition to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. Following discovery on the matters raised in Sky Zone's petition, the trial court denied it by order of January 25, 2022. The Honorable Stella M. Tsai ruled that Ms. Shultz was not bound by Mr. Shultz's execution of the agreement because he was not acting as her agent when he signed it, and that parents lack the authority to waive their children's rights to file a lawsuit for their injuries. **See** Order, 1/25/22, at 2, 5.

On February 24, 2022, Sky Zone filed a notice of appeal, and both Sky Zone and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Sky Zone states the following questions in the Shultz appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the arbitration provision set forth in the waiver signed by [Mr. Shultz] has no binding effect on the claims of [Ms. Shultz] who was his wife—and therefore, acting as her agent—at the time he signed the waiver.
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the claims made by [Rocco] are not subject to the arbitration provision set forth in the waiver signed by [Mr. Shultz], such that minor [Rocco] may now disavow this waiver and bring his claims—which fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration provision—before a court of law.

Sky Zone's brief (Shultz) at 12 (cleaned up).

B. The Santiago Plaintiffs

In February 2019, Jennifer Santiago took her two minor daughters to a different Sky Zone location. Prior to their admittance to the play area, Ms. Santiago executed the same six-page digital Agreement as did Mr. Shultz,

acknowledging that she was waiving her rights, as well as those of her spouse and children, to seek redress in a jury trial for any injuries sustained or to recover any damages for such an injury, and agreeing to arbitrate any disputes.

Isabella Santiago, then three years old, proceeded to play on a trampoline during designated “toddler time” in a “toddler zone.” Complaint, 2/23/21, at ¶ 23. In the absence of any Sky Zone employee monitoring the area, an adult male elected to use the same trampoline as the child. *Id.* at ¶¶ 23-24. The man’s jumping threw Isabella toward another trampoline, causing her to fracture her knee on the seam in between and to require immediate and future medical care. *Id.* at ¶¶ 23, 27, 29.

Ms. Santiago and her husband, Samuel Santiago, individually and on Isabella’s behalf, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County seeking to recover money damages related to Isabella’s injury. Sky Zone moved to stay the court proceedings and to compel arbitration, contending that the Agreement was a valid arbitration agreement and that all three plaintiffs’ claims were within its scope. The Santiagos responded, acknowledging that Ms. Santiago executed the Agreement, but denying its validity to compel arbitration of the claims of Mr. Santiago or Isabella. Specifically, they contended that Ms. Santiago’s unilateral execution of the Agreement was ineffective to bind her spouse or her child.

The trial court ordered discovery limited to Sky Zone's petition, after which the parties filed supplemental briefs. On August 23, 2021, the Honorable Angelo J. Foglietta denied Sky Zone's petition. Sky Zone filed a motion for the trial court to amend its order to certify it as immediately appealable pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b) and to stay the action pending appeal. The trial court denied the motion to amend by order of October 12, 2021.

On November 4, 2021, Sky Zone filed in this Court a petition for permission to appeal, which we denied as moot because an order denying an application to compel arbitration is immediately appealable as of right pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 7320(a)(1). Instead, we treated Sky Zone's petition as a notice of appeal in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1316(a) ("The appellate court shall treat a request for discretionary review of an order that is immediately appealable as a notice of appeal if a party has filed a timely petition for permission to appeal[.]"). Thereafter, both Sky Zone and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Sky Zone presents this Court with the following questions in the Santiago appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Sky Zone's] motion to amend order and stay litigation, where amending and certifying the order denying [Sky Zone's] motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation for immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of this matter and involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion?

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Sky Zone's] motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation thereby allowing Plaintiffs to continue to litigate their respective claims before the trial court, where the participant agreement, release and assumption signed by [Ms. Santiago] included a provision that clearly and unambiguously required that any and all disputes, claims, or controversies arising out of or relating to [Isabella's] use of [Sky Zone's] premises and equipment be submitted to and settled by binding arbitration?

Sky Zone's brief (Santiago) at 7-8 (re-ordered and cleaned up).

II. Applicable Legal Principles

We begin our examination of Sky Zone's issues with a review of the governing legal principles. "An order denying a petition to compel arbitration is an interlocutory order appealable as of right."³ ***Fineman, Krekstein & Harris, P.C. v. Perr***, 278 A.3d 385, 389 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). "[W]e employ a two-part test to determine whether the trial court should have compelled arbitration. First, we examine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. Second, we must determine whether the dispute is within the scope of the agreement." ***Id.*** (cleaned up).

Our standard of review "is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition." ***Id.*** (cleaned up). However, "[w]hether a claim is within the scope of an arbitration provision is

³ This resolves Sky Zone's first question in the Santiago appeal: because Sky Zone had a statutory right to immediately appeal from the order denying its petition to compel arbitration, there was no need for the trial court to certify it for immediate appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b).

a matter of contract, and as with all questions of law, our review of the trial court's conclusion is plenary." **Id.** (cleaned up).

When addressing the issue of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, courts generally should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts, but in doing so, must give due regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration. However, the mere existence of an arbitration provision and a liberal policy favoring arbitration does not require the rubber stamping of all disputes as subject to arbitration.

Adams v. Mt. Lebanon Operations, LLC, 276 A.3d 1203, 1206 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

As a general rule of contract law, only the parties to an arbitration agreement may be compelled to arbitrate. **See, e.g., Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC**, 263 A.3d 8, 14 (Pa.Super. 2021) ("[A] party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." (cleaned up)). "Nevertheless, a party can be compelled to arbitrate under an agreement, even if he or she did not sign that agreement, if common law principles of agency and contract support such an obligation on his or her part."⁴ **Id.** at 15 (cleaned up).

⁴ We observe that a third-party beneficiary to a contract may also be bound by an arbitration agreement contained therein. **See, e.g., Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc.**, 77 A.3d 651, 661 (Pa.Super. 2013) ("[A] nonparty, such as a third-party beneficiary, may fall within the scope of an arbitration agreement if that is the parties' intent."). Sky Zone does not contend that the minors are bound as third-party beneficiaries to the Agreement. Accordingly, we do not consider third-party-beneficiary status as a basis for deciding whether the minors are bound by the arbitration provision of the Agreement.

The existence of an agency relationship is a factual question for which the party asserting an agency relationship has the burden of proof. **See, e.g., *McIlwain v. Saber Healthcare Grp., Inc., LLC***, 208 A.3d 478, 485 (Pa.Super. 2019). There are four ways to create an agency relationship: “(1) express authority, (2) implied authority, (3) apparent authority, and/or (4) authority by estoppel.” ***Id.*** (cleaned up). As this Court has summarized:

Express authority exists where **the principal** deliberately and specifically grants authority to the agent as to certain matters. Implied authority exists in situations where the agent’s actions are proper, usual and necessary to carry out express agency. Apparent authority exists where **the principal**, by word or conduct, causes people with whom the alleged agent deals to believe that the principal has granted the agent authority to act. Authority by estoppel occurs when **the principal fails** to take reasonable steps to disavow the third party of their belief that the purported agent was authorized to act on behalf of the principal.

Id. (cleaned up, emphases added). Hence, in determining whether a person is the agent of another, the focus is on the conduct of the principal, not on that of the purported agent. **See, e.g., *id.*** at 486 (“[A]n agent cannot simply, by her own words, invest herself with apparent authority.”).

Critically, “[a]gency cannot be inferred from mere relationships or family ties, and we do not assume agency merely because one person acts on behalf of another.” ***Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC***, 124 A.3d 317, 323 (Pa.Super. 2015). **See also *US Coal Corp. v. Dinning***, 222 A.3d 431, 441 (Pa.Super. 2019) (“The relationship of agency cannot be inferred from mere relationship or family ties unattended by conditions, acts or conduct clearly implying an agency.” (cleaned up)). Specifically, “[i]t is well settled

that neither a husband nor wife has the power to act as agent for the other merely due to the marriage relationship.” ***Washburn v. N. Health Facilities, Inc.***, 121 A.3d 1008, 1014 (Pa.Super. 2015). “Rather, we look to facts to determine whether **the principal** expressly or impliedly intended to create an agency relationship. To that end, family ties may be relevant when considered with other factors evincing agency.” ***Wisler, supra*** at 323 (emphasis added).

III. Analysis

With the above principles in mind, we turn to Sky Zone’s appellate issues, beginning with its claims that the trial courts improperly ruled that the parent signing each Agreement was not the agent for his or her absent spouse for purposes of agreeing to arbitrate any claims arising from the children’s use of the facilities.

A. Mr. Santiago

Sky Zone asserts that the evidence demonstrated that Ms. Santiago had apparent and implied authority to sign the Agreement as Mr. Santiago’s agent. Sky Zone’s brief (Santiago) at 24. Sky Zone observes that it is undisputed that the Santiagos were married at the time Ms. Santiago signed the Agreement purporting to bind herself and spouse. ***Id.*** at 22. Sky Zone argues that, “by nature of their marital relationship and her role as [Isabella’s] mother, [Ms.] Santiago had apparent authority to bind [Mr.] Santiago to the terms of the Agreement,” and “caused [Sky Zone] to believe that she had

authority to sign the Agreement on both her own and [Mr.] Santiago's behalf." ***Id.*** at 23.

Sky Zone further posits that it "cannot possibly be expected to ask each and every patron, in signing the agreement, if they have actual authority to sign on behalf of their spouse." ***Id.*** at 24. It maintains that, "[i]nstead, it was reasonable for [Sky Zone] to rely upon the representations of the signing spouse as to her authority to sign on behalf of her husband." ***Id.***

We find Sky Zone's arguments wholly unavailing. Sky Zone improperly focuses on the actions of the purported agent, not that of the non-signing principal, in asserting implied and apparent authority in this case. As noted above, implied authority only pertains where the agent's actions are necessary to carry out express agency. ***See McIlwain, supra*** at 485. Here, the certified record contains no evidence that Mr. Santiago deliberately and specifically granted his wife authority to sign as his agent, defeating any claim of either express or implied agency.

Similarly, apparent authority is present "where **the principal**, by word or conduct, causes people with whom the alleged agent deals to believe that the principal has granted the agent authority to act." ***Id.*** (emphasis added). Sky Zone cites no evidence that Mr. Santiago had any interaction at all with Sky Zone, let alone that he caused it by his word or deed to believe that Ms. Santiago was his agent. Rather, it relies solely upon the familial relationship and the conduct of the purported agent to support its assertion of agency,

which is a meritless argument. ***See, e.g., US Coal Corp., supra*** at 441 (“The relationship of agency cannot be inferred from mere relationship or family ties unattended by conditions, acts or conduct clearly implying an agency.” (cleaned up)). Absent verbal or nonverbal communication **from Mr. Santiago** that caused Sky Zone to believe that he authorized Ms. Santiago to agree on his behalf to arbitrate any claims, Sky Zone has failed to establish that Ms. Santiago had apparent authority to act as her husband’s agent.

We further reject Sky Zone’s lament that it “cannot possibly be expected” to make sure that a person executing its digital Agreement had the authority to agree on her own behalf as well as that of her “spouse or domestic partner, the Child, and our respective and/or collective issue, parents, siblings, heirs, assigns, personal representatives, estate(s), and anyone else who can claim by or through such person or persons.” Petition to Compel Arbitration, 1/21/21, Exhibit B at 6. It is well-settled that a third party must exercise reasonable diligence to determine the authority of an apparent agent, and “can rely on the apparent authority of an agent when this is a reasonable interpretation of **the manifestations of the principal.**” ***Bolus v. United Penn Bank***, 525 A.2d 1215, 1222 (Pa.Super. 1987). Sky Zone has presented no evidence of any diligence in learning whether Mr. Santiago authorized his wife to bind him to arbitration and no indication that Mr. Santiago otherwise

manifested such an intent to Sky Zone prior to her execution of the Agreement.

It is axiomatic in the law of contracts that only parties to the agreement are bound thereby. ***See, e.g., Humphrey, supra*** at 14 (“[A] party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (cleaned up)). If Sky Zone wishes to create enforceable agreements to arbitrate from the laundry list of people it seeks to preclude from filing claims against it in a court of law, then obtaining the assent of each of those persons, directly or through the recognized principles of agency, is precisely what it must do.

B. Ms. Shultz

Sky Zone’s arguments as to Ms. Shultz are nearly identical to those it proffered as to Mr. Santiago. Sky Zone maintains that, given their marital relationship and his role as Rocco’s father, and Mr. Shultz’s representation that he had authority to sign for his spouse and anyone else associated with Rocco, Mr. Shultz had the apparent authority to bind Ms. Shultz to the arbitration agreement. ***See*** Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) at 29.

Sky Zone offers two additional facts in the Shultz case to support its agency contentions. First, it asserts that Ms. Shultz offered testimony indicating that her husband had authority to sign the Agreement on her behalf. ***Id.*** at 28. Specifically, Sky Zone represents that Ms. Shultz testified that Mr. Shultz “would have been the parent to sign any contracts for the both of

them on behalf of their children,” and that, while she recalled no specific instances of that happening, “it would not have been surprising to her if he had done so.” **Id.** at 28-29. Sky Zone suggests that this evinces that Mr. Shultz “had implied and apparent authority to sign the Agreement on [Ms.] Shultz’s behalf and bind her to the terms of this Agreement.” **Id.** at 29. Indeed, Sky Zone goes so far as to say that Ms. Shultz “affirmatively testified” that Mr. Shultz had her “approval to execute a contract on her behalf as it relates to their children” and that he “exercised this authority on a regular basis.” **Id.** at 29-30.

These assertions are not supported by the certified record. The two pages of Ms. Shultz’s deposition transcript upon which Sky Zone relies neither contains any such testimony nor supports the representations made by Sky Zone.⁵ One begins mid-question with “to is, would it have surprised you if [Mr. Shultz] had signed that?” to which Ms. Shultz answered, “No. I guess not, no.” and contains no other pertinent testimony. Supplemental Brief in Support of Response to Motion to Compel Arbitration, 6/29/21, at Exhibit B (Deposition of Ms. Shultz, 5/19/21, at 28). The other contains the following, abruptly-ending excerpt:

Q Do you know if [Mr.] Shultz has ever signed any contracts or agreements on behalf of you as a couple?

⁵ Sky Zone did not include the entirety of the transcript of Ms. Shultz’s deposition, but rather excerpts of a page here and a page there lacking context.

A No, I don't believe so.

Q Does Rocco go to school?

A Yeah.

Q Does Rocco play any sports?

A No.

Q I think you mentioned soccer at some point before this.

A He has been unable to since this happened.

Q But prior to this, he did play soccer?

A Yeah.

Q Did you ever have to sign anything in connection with that?

A I'm sure Ryan did. I don't think I did.

Q So Ryan Shultz signed something, you think, on behalf of Rocco in order to allow him to play soccer?

[Counsel for Ms. Shultz]: If you know. I'm fine with [. . . .]

Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration, 6/29/21, at Exhibit 1 (Deposition of Ms. Shultz, 5/19/21, at 45).

This evidence suggests that Mr. Shultz might have signed some undisclosed paperwork at some indefinite time for Rocco to play soccer. It comes woefully short of indicating that Ms. Shultz gave her husband blanket authority to bind her to contracts and that he exercised that authority frequently. Moreover, nothing Ms. Shultz stated in her May 2021 deposition suggests that she caused Sky Zone to believe that Mr. Shultz was authorized to sign the Agreement on her behalf in August 2018.

The second fact cited by Sky Zone that distinguishes this case from the Santiago case is that Rocco had been to Sky Zone prior to the date he was injured there. **See** Sky Zone's brief (Shultz) at 20 (indicating that Rocco "had been to [Sky Zone's] trampoline park prior to the date of the alleged accident."); **id.** at 30 (stating that Rocco had been to Sky Zone "multiple times without any objection" from Ms. Shultz). It is unclear when these visits occurred or whether Ms. Shultz or someone else accompanied Rocco on the prior occasions, as Sky Zone does not cite where this fact is documented in the certified record. Presumably, if Ms. Shultz had herself signed an arbitration agreement on a prior visit, Sky Zone would assert that as a basis to compel her to arbitrate her claims. Likewise, if a witness had seen Ms. Shultz engage in conduct at a prior visit indicating that her husband was authorized to act as her agent in the future, we would expect Sky Zone to have produced testimony from that person. Instead, we have no information whether Ms. Shultz was even aware that Rocco had visited Sky Zone before, let alone that she caused Sky Zone to believe, prior to Mr. Shultz's execution of the Agreement on the day in question, that Mr. Shultz was her authorized agent for purposes of agreeing to arbitration.

Accordingly, Sky Zone's arguments in support of compelling Ms. Shultz to arbitrate her claims fail for the same reasons we discussed in connection with Mr. Santiago: without any conduct by Ms. Shultz that suggested to Sky Zone that she had authorized Mr. Shultz to agree on her behalf to arbitrate

any of her potential claims, Sky Zone failed to establish that Mr. Shultz had apparent authority to act as her agent.

C. Rocco and Isabella

Finally, we reach the novel question of Pennsylvania law common to both of these appeals: whether a parent, in the role of natural guardian, as opposed to a court-appointed guardian, is the equivalent of being the child's agent for purposes of making a minor child a party to an arbitration agreement, thereby waiving the child's right to a jury trial. In resolving this issue, we begin with a discussion of some principles pertinent to a child's legal status.

We observe at the outset that Rocco and Isabella could not have themselves agreed to arbitrate any potential claims against Sky Zone. Minors lack the capacity to agree to an arbitration agreement or any other contract in their own right. Rather, it has long been the law that minors lack capacity to contract. **See, e.g., *In re O'Leary's Estate***, 42 A.2d 624, 625 (Pa. 1945) ("An infant is not competent to contract."). A contract executed by a minor is not void *ab initio*, but is voidable such that the minor may, upon reaching majority, avoid any contract other than for necessities. **See, e.g., *Wharen v. Funk***, 31 A.2d 450, 452 (Pa.Super. 1943) ("[I]nfants may avoid their contracts on reaching majority.").

As such, minors lack the capacity to grant express authority to an agent to contract on their behalves, rendering any such resulting contracts voidable.

See Rest. (2d) Agency § 20 cmt. c (1958) (“The contract of an infant to employ an agent is voidable by him, as is any contract made for him by such agent, except a contract for necessities.”). Rather, minors act through their guardians.

We have explained that “Pennsylvania law defines a guardian as a person lawfully invested with the power, and charged with the duty, of taking care of the person and/or managing the property and rights of another person, who, for defect of age, understanding or self-control is considered incapable of administering his own affairs.” **Rock v. Pyle**, 720 A.2d 137, 141 (Pa. Super. 1998). “Two classes of guardians have long been recognized at law: (1) guardian of the person being invested with the care of the person of the minor, and (2) guardian of the estate being entrusted with the control of the property of the minor.” **Id.** “The spheres of authority of a guardian of the person and of a guardian of the estate are distinct and mutually exclusive.” **Id.**

Statutory mechanisms exist for the court appointment and supervision of guardians for minors. **See** 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101-5167. However, “parents have intrinsic rights and responsibilities as the natural guardians of their minor children.” **Rehrer v. Youst**, 91 A.3d 183, 192 (Pa.Super. 2014). Natural guardianship grants a parent “primary physical responsibility for the care and custody of the minor child.” **Rock, supra** at 141. Yet “natural guardianship confers no inherent right to intermeddle with the property of the minor child,

and the natural guardian has no inherent authority to demand or power to receive, hold or manage the minor's property unless the natural guardian has also been appointed as guardian of the minor's estate." **Id. See also Rehrer, supra** at 192 ("[N]atural guardianship confers no right to intermeddle with the property of the infant . . .; a natural guardian has no authority whatever to exercise any control over the estate of the minor." (cleaned up)). Rather, by statute, "[l]egal title to all real and personal property of a minor shall remain in him, subject, however, to all the powers granted to his guardian by this title and lawfully by a governing instrument and to all orders of the court." 20 Pa.C.S. § 303.

Pennsylvania courts have observed that "[a] cause of action is property[.]" **Tri-State Asphalt Corp. v. Dep't of Transp.**, 875 A.2d 1199, 1202 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2005) (citing **Fejerdy v. Fejerdy**, 437 A.2d 1244 (Pa.Super. 1981)). In situations when a minor is injured, two distinct causes of action arise, "one the parents' claim for medical expenses and loss of the minor's services during minority, the other the minor's claim for pain and suffering and for losses after minority." **Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments**, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (Pa.Super. 1989) (cleaned up).

A parent obviously may pursue his or her own cause of action in tort in connection with the child's injury, subject to a two-year statute of limitations. **See** 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). However, "children have a distinct legal disability, as they are prohibited from personally bringing a cause of action before

reaching the age of majority.” ***Nicole B. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia***, 237 A.3d 986, 993 (Pa. 2020). Accordingly, “to safeguard certain minors’ rights during their period of legal disability,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533 “exempt[s] children from the operation of statutes of limitations during their period of legal disability, and enabl[es] them to bring a civil action on their own behalf upon reaching the age of majority.” ***Id.***

Alternatively, a parent “has the natural and primary right to bring an action, as guardian, on behalf of his or her child,” ***Dengler by Dengler v. Crisman***, 516 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Pa.Super. 1986). Nonetheless, “[a] minor’s representation is subject to the trial court’s control and supervision, and it has the right in each case to determine whether the litigation is in the minor’s best interests.” ***Rehrer, supra*** at 193. Furthermore, “[n]o action to which a minor is a party shall be compromised, settled or discontinued except after approval by the court pursuant to a petition presented by the guardian of the minor.” Pa.R.C.P. 2039(a).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the rulings at issue in these cases. The Santiago trial court, citing the tolling of the statute of limitations for Isabella’s personal injury claims, concluded that Ms. Santiago “could not legally sign away [Isabella’s] future claim for any injuries sustained while in [Sky Zone]’s facility.” Trial Court Opinion (Santiago), 7/1/22, at 4. The Shultz trial court likewise ruled that Mr. Shultz lacked the authority to bind Rocco to arbitration of his claim, but relied upon federal district court decisions

purporting to apply Pennsylvania law. Specifically, the Shultz trial court cited cases premised generally upon a child's right to avoid contracts entered during the child's minority, and, particular to arbitration agreements, discussed the ruling in ***Troshak v. Terminix Intern. Co., L.P.***, CIV. A. 98-1727, 1998 WL 401693 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998) (unpublished decision).

In ***Troshak***, the father signed a "Termite Service Plan" agreement in connection with Terminix's provision of termite control services at the Troshak home in Pennsylvania. Alleging that Terminix's service caused personal injury and property damage, the family brought a civil action that was removed to federal court. There, Terminix sought to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in the service plan contract. The trial court was thus tasked with determining which family members were bound by the contract entered into by the father. Regarding the personal injury claims of the minor child, Terminix argued that the father had waived the child's right to proceed in court. Noting the lack of Pennsylvania authority on the issue, the court examined two other district court decisions, which it summarized as follows:

In ***Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Academy and Junior College***, 630 F.Supp. 20, 23 (E.D.Pa.1985), the court ruled that "under Pennsylvania law, Parents do not possess the authority to release the claims or potential claims of a minor child merely because of the parental relationship." In ***Apicella***, the parents of Jerry Apicella enrolled their minor son as a student at Valley Forge. At that time, Valerie and John Apicella informed school officials that Jerry Apicella suffered from hemophilia. To persuade the school to enroll their son, the Apicella[s] signed a document releasing Valley Forge "from all claims and damages arising from or related to or in any way connected with their son Jerry's hemophilic condition." School officials permitted Jerry to

attend the school. Subsequently, Valerie and John Apicella, as the parents of Jerry Apicella, and Jerry Apicella on his own behalf, brought suit against Valley Forge claiming that the school and its employees were negligent in their care of Jerry Apicella. Valley Forge asserted that Jerry was estopped from asserting his cause of action because his parents signed a document releasing it from claims and damages arising from Jerry's hemophilic condition. The court rejected that argument. Based on analogous Pennsylvania case law, the court held that "John and Valerie Apicella released the defendants from potential claims which they had the right to assert but did not release the defendants from claims or potential claims which Jerry Apicella might assert upon reaching the age of majority." This ruling was adopted in ***Simmons by Grinnel v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr.***, 670 F.Supp. 140 (E.D.Pa.1987).

In ***Simmons***, a minor and her parent sued a gymnastic organization for personal injuries suffered by the minor while the minor was participating as a gymnast at the defendant training center. The defendant training center asserted the signing of a release as an affirmative defense. The release was signed by the minor and by the minor's mother. The release was prospective in nature and was intended to release the defendant from future liability as opposed to an already existing claim for damages. The court found that the minor's parent was bound by the release. The defendant asserted, *inter alia*, that the minor's claim was barred because the parent signed the release for the minor. Relying on ***Apicella***, the court found that the minor's parent could not release the defendant from the potential claims that eventually accrued to the minor.

Id. at *4-*5 (some citations omitted). The ***Troshak*** trial court acknowledged that ***Apicella*** and ***Simmons*** were not precisely on point, but concluded that, "under the reasoning and holdings interpreting Pennsylvania law contained in" those cases, "a parent cannot bind a minor child to an arbitration provision that requires the minor to waive his or her right to file potential claims for personal injury in a court of law." ***Id.*** at *5. The court explained that, since a parent could not prospectively release a minor's potential claims, it follows

that “a parent does not have authority to bind a minor child to an arbitration provision that requires the minor to waive their right to have potential claims for personal injury filed in a court of law.” ***Id.***

Adopting this reasoning, the Shultz trial court concluded that Mr. Shultz’s execution of the Agreement was not effective in waiving Rocco’s right to file the instant action in court. Trial Court Opinion (Shultz), at 5. The court further ruled that, to the extent that Rocco was required to disaffirm the voidable contract made on his behalf by Mr. Shultz, Rocco’s action of bringing this suit constituted such disaffirmance. ***Id.*** (citing ***Haines v. Fitzgerald***, 165 A. 52, 55 (Pa.Super. 1933) (holding that bringing suit three months after reaching majority constituted disaffirmance of contract made during plaintiff’s minority). Accordingly, the Shultz court denied Sky Zone’s petition as to Rocco’s claims.

Sky Zone proffers the same basic argument for reversal in both of these cases. It argues that ***Troshak***, which is not binding on this Court, improperly conflates the release of a minor’s personal substantive claims with a mere “agreement to litigate a dispute in a specific forum.” Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) at 34. Sky Zone asserts that the more persuasive non-binding authority is found in the decisions of our sister states that recognized that distinction: ***Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park***, 901 A.2d 381 (N.J. 2006), and ***Cross v. Carnes***, 724 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).

In ***Hojnowski***, a twelve-year-old boy was injured at a skate park operated by defendant Vans. Before using the park, the boy's mother had executed a release and waiver that included an arbitration clause. When the boy sued through his parents as guardians *ad litem*, Vans moved to compel arbitration. The trial court granted Vans's motion, declining to rule on the validity of the release because it was an issue for the arbitrators to decide. The appellate court unanimously affirmed a parent's ability to "enter into an enforceable contract, binding on the parent's minor child, that waives the right to trial by jury of the minor's bodily injury claims and requires submission of 'any dispute' to arbitration." ***Hojnowski, supra*** at 385 (cleaned up). The panel also fully agreed that the court should have considered whether the substantive waiver violated public policy, but divided on the answer to that question.

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the exculpatory provision was invalid given "the protections that our State historically has afforded to a minor's claims and the need to discourage negligent activity on the part of commercial enterprises attracting children," noting that it was in that regard consistent "with the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions." ***Id.*** at 388-89 (citing, *inter alia*, ***Simmons*** and ***Apicella***).

However, the Court found no such public-policy reason to invalidate the waiver's arbitration clause. The Court explained: "As opposed to a pre-injury release of liability, a pre-injury agreement to arbitrate does not require a

minor to forego any substantive rights. Rather, such an agreement specifies only the forum in which those rights are vindicated.” **Id.** at 392. Further, the Court held that a parent is “permitted to bind a minor child to arbitration,” holding that, unless general contract defenses such as “fraud, duress, or unconscionability in the signing of the contract or that the agreement to arbitrate was not written in clear and unambiguous terms,” then “a parent’s agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable against any tort claims asserted on a minor’s behalf.” **Id.** at 393-94.

The **Hojnowski** Court cited as persuasive the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals in **Cross**. In that case, the minor’s mother executed, on her own behalf and on behalf of her daughter, a consent and release that permitted her daughter to appear on a television talk show. The document contained an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the minor’s appearance on the show. Displeased with her portrayal on the program, the minor, through her mother, sued the show for defamation. The show moved to enforce the arbitration agreement, and the trial court granted the motion, staying the court proceedings pending arbitration. The appellate court affirmed. It first noted that the Ohio Supreme Court had recently ruled that “public policy justifies giving parents authority to enter into . . . binding [pre-injury exculpatory] agreements on behalf of their minor children” that further the public policy of making non-profit recreational sporting activities affordable. **Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc.**, 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio

1998). The **Cross** Court indicated that the **Zivich** “holding leads us to believe that our conclusion, that a parent has the authority to bind his or her child to a resolution of the child’s claims through arbitration, is correct under Ohio law.” **Cross, supra** at 836. The Court continued:

In so holding, we note that the parent’s consent and release to arbitration only specifies the forum for resolution of the child’s claim; it does not extinguish the claim. Logically, if a parent has the authority to bring and conduct a lawsuit on behalf of the child, he or she has the same authority to choose arbitration as the litigation forum.

Id.⁶

We are unpersuaded by Sky Zone’s arguments in general and its reliance upon the **Hojnowski** and **Cross** decisions in particular. We reiterate that the issue before us is whether there exists in each case an agreement to arbitrate to which the minor child was a party or otherwise bound. **See Humphrey, supra** at 14 (“[A] party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (cleaned up)). It is only if “common law principles of agency and contract” render the respective parents capable of contracting on behalf of their children that the children are bound to arbitrate in these cases. **Id.** at 15 (cleaned up).

⁶ As the **Hojnowski** Court relied upon **Cross** in reaching its conclusion, the **Cross** Court in turn relied upon **Leong by Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.**, 788 P.2d 164, 169 (Hawaii 1990), and **Doyle v. Giuliucci**, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965). **See Cross v. Carnes**, 724 N.E.2d 828, 836 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). We observe that both of those cases affirmed a parent’s ability to bind a child to an arbitration provision in a contract of which the child is a **third-party beneficiary**. As noted above, Sky Zone has never posited that Rocco and Isabella were bound by the Agreement as third-party beneficiaries.

The foundation of the **Cross** ruling, which informed the **Hojnowski** decision, is that, because parents can choose to sue in court on behalf of their minor children, they are just as authorized to choose to arbitrate the claims instead. However, as discussed above, a parent's right to pursue litigation on behalf of a minor child "is subject to the trial court's control and supervision, and it has the right in each case to determine whether the litigation is in the minor's best interests." **Rehrer, supra** at 193. Concomitantly, a parent suing on a child's behalf as natural guardian nonetheless lacks authority to settle or discontinue without court approval. **See** Pa.R.C.P. 2039(a). Moreover, no Pennsylvania court has ruled that a parent has a right to enter a pre-injury release of a child's right to bring substantive claims as did the Ohio Supreme Court, and the above-referenced law protecting minors' substantive legal claims suggests to us that the federal district courts accurately predicted that Pennsylvania would reject that proposition as did the **Hojnowski** Court. **See Simmons, supra** and **Apicella, supra**.

In our view, the court involvement in a parent's litigation of a minor child's claims has the significant effect of transforming the parent's role from that of a natural guardian into, in essence, a court-approved guardian who has authority to make decisions about the minor's estate, not merely the

child's person.⁷ An agreement executed by natural guardian purportedly on the minor's behalf without any court involvement, however, has none of the legal safeguards attendant to the appointment of a guardian of the minor's estate. Consequently, the parents in their pre-litigation state of natural guardianship lacked any authority to manage the estate of their minor children. ***See, e.g., Rock, supra*** at 141 ("[N]atural guardianship confers no inherent right to intermeddle with the property of the minor child, and the natural guardian has no inherent authority to demand or power to receive, hold or manage the minor's property **unless the natural guardian has also been appointed as guardian of the minor's estate.**" (emphasis added)).

Therefore, we conclude that, in the absence of any suggestion that Rocco and Isabella were third-party beneficiaries of the Agreement, or that their respective parents were authorized to sign the agreements on their behalves, the statuses of Mr. Shultz and Ms. Santiago as natural guardians did not *ipso facto* grant them the authority to bind their minor children to an arbitration agreement. Consequently, we hold that the trial courts properly denied Sky Zone's petitions to compel arbitration of the claims of Rocco and Isabella.


⁷ ***See*** 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 5111-5116 (concerning appointment of guardians for minors). ***See also*** 20 Pa.C.S. § 5101 (indicating certain circumstances when a guardian of minor with small estates is unnecessary); 20 Pa.C.S. § 5102 (providing that a court may authorize a parent as natural guardian to execute certain documents).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the respective trial courts properly ruled that no agreements bound the children or non-signing spouses to resolve the alleged negligence claims in arbitration rather than in the courts. Specifically, we agree with the trial courts that Sky Zone failed to meet its burden to show that the signatory spouses were the agents of the non-signing spouses. Further, we hold that the parent-child relationship did not empower the signatory parents to waive their minor children's rights to have their claims resolved in a court of law. Therefore, we affirm.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Joseph D. Seletyn", is written over a horizontal line.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023

TAB “B” – AMICUS BRIEF

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket No. ____

Jennifer Santiago and Samuel Santiago;

Respondents,

vs.

Philly Trampoline Park, LLC, I/P/A Sky Zone, D/B/A Sky Zone Trampoline Park D/B/A Sky Zone Philadelphia, Sky Zone Philadelphia, Inc., Sky Zone Trampoline Park A/K/A/ Sky Zone Philadelphia;

Petitioners.

Petition for allowance of appeal from an opinion and order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Docket Nos. 2615 EDA 2021 and 664 EDA 2022, dated March 21, 2023, affirming an order entered January 25, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County at Docket No. 200701660

**BRIEF OF *AMICI CURIAE* GET AIR MANAGEMENT, INC.;
PENNSYLVANIA COALITION FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM;
PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION; and
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS, INC.
SUPPORTING THE PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL**

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April 20, 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | | |
|------|--|----|
| I. | INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| II. | INTERESTS OF <i>AMICI</i> | 1 |
| III. | REASONS FOR GRANTING ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL | 3 |
| A. | The Court should decide whether parents or guardians have the authority to bind their child to arbitration..... | 3 |
| B. | The panel erred when it declined to enforce the arbitration agreement in this case. | 7 |
| 1. | The panel’s decision erodes the policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements..... | 7 |
| 2. | The panel’s decision puts Pennsylvania at odds with other states on this important issue. | 8 |
| 3. | The panel’s decision rests on a flawed premise that agreeing to arbitrate a minor’s claim is the same as waiving the minor’s claim. | 8 |
| 4. | The panel overstepped its role by creating an exception to arbitration for minors..... | 9 |
| 5. | The panel’s decision engenders significant concerns for <i>amici</i> and the business community..... | 10 |
| C. | The panel’s decision may disincentivize business investment in the Commonwealth..... | 11 |
| IV. | CONCLUSION..... | 12 |

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

| | |
|--|------|
| <i>Capecchi v. Joseph Capecchi, Inc.</i> , 139 A.2d 563, 565 (Pa. 1958)..... | 4 |
| <i>Cross v. Carnes</i> , 724 N.E.2d 828, 836 (Oh. Ct. App. 1998)..... | 6, 9 |
| <i>Doyle v. Giuliucci</i> , 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965)..... | 6 |
| <i>Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea</i> , 908 So.2d 392, 405 (Fla. 2005)..... | 6, 9 |
| <i>Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park</i> , 901 A.2d 381 (N.J. 2006)..... | 6, 9 |
| <i>Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark</i> , 581 U.S. 246, 248 (2017)..... | 4 |
| <i>Leong ex rel. Leong v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps.</i> , 788 P.2d 164, 166 (Haw. 1990) | 6 |
| <i>Martin v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review</i> , 466 A.2d 107, 111-13 (Pa. 1963) | 10 |
| <i>Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth Inc.</i> , 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)..... | 4 |
| <i>Provenzano v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp.</i> , 121 A.3d 1085, 1097-98 (Pa. Super. 2015)..... | 8 |
| <i>Saltzman v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., Inc.</i> , 166 A. 3d 465, 472 (Pa. Super. 2017) | 6 |
| <i>Troxel v. Granville</i> , 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000)..... | 5 |

Statutes

| | |
|---|---|
| 42 Pa. C.S. § 7301 <i>et seq.</i> | 4 |
| Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 | 4 |

Other Authorities

| | |
|---|---|
| Soia Mentschikoff, <i>The Significance of Arbitration</i> , 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698 (1952)..... | 5 |
|---|---|

Rules

| | |
|----------------------------|---|
| Pa.R.A.P. 1114 | 3 |
| Supreme Court IOP § 6..... | 3 |

I. INTRODUCTION

Amici Get Air Management, Inc. (“Get Air”) and the Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform (“PCCJR”); the Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association (“PMA”); and the National Federation of Independent Business, Inc. (“NFIB”) (“Associations”) support the petition for allowance of appeal filed by Sky Zone. In this case of first impression, the Court should allow an appeal and hold that parents or guardians have the authority to bind their child to an arbitration agreement.¹

II. INTERESTS OF *AMICI*

Get Air provides management services to Get Air brand name trampoline parks. It helps manage a myriad of trampoline parks throughout the nation, including two locations in Pennsylvania. Get Air’s trampoline parks feature wall-to-wall trampolines, dodgeball courts, basketball lanes, and obstacle courses. In the past five years, Get Air has grown into a recognizable national brand.

PCCJR is a statewide, nonpartisan alliance of organizations and individuals representing health care providers, professional and trade

¹ No person or entity other than the *amici*, their members, or their counsel either paid in whole or in part for the preparation of the *amici*’s brief or authored in whole or in part the *amici*’s brief.

associations, businesses, nonprofit entities, taxpayers, and other perspectives. PCCJR is dedicated to bringing fairness to litigants by elevating awareness of civil justice issues and advocating for reform.

PMA has served as a leading voice for Pennsylvania manufacturing, its 540,000 employees on the plant floor, and the millions of additional jobs in supporting industries. PMA seeks to improve the Commonwealth's competitiveness by promoting pro-growth public policies that reduce the cost of creating and keeping jobs in Pennsylvania. PMA has forcefully advocated for civil justice reforms that will bring balance and stability to Pennsylvania's legal system.

NFIB is the nation's leading small business association. NFIB's mission is to promote and protect the right of its members to own, operate, and grow their businesses. NFIB represents, in Washington, D.C., and all 50 state capitals, the interests of its members.

Amici have a significant interest in this case. A panel of the Superior Court, in a reported opinion, declined to enforce an agreement signed by a minor's parent that requires arbitration of the minor's personal injury claim against Sky Zone, even though the parent agreed to arbitration on the minor's behalf and the claim indisputably falls

within the scope of the agreement. Among other things, the panel reasoned that an agreement signed by a parent or guardian to arbitrate the child's claim essentially is the same as waiving the child's claim.

The Court should allow an appeal and reverse. The panel's decision erodes the policy favoring arbitration, rests on a flawed presumption that a prospective selection of arbitration is the same as waiving a child's cause of action altogether, and engenders significant concerns for *amici* by calling into question agreements signed by parents to resolve their children's claims by arbitration rather than in the court.

III. REASONS FOR GRANTING ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL

The Court allows an appeal "when there are special and important reasons therefor," including when a case involves a question of first impression or one of substantial public importance. *See* Pa.R.A.P. 1114; Supreme Court IOP § 6. *Amici* urge the Court to grant allowance of appeal and offer additional perspectives to assist the Court in its decision.

A. The Court should decide whether parents or guardians have the authority to bind their child to arbitration.

This case is *not* about waiving a minor's cause of action. This case involves whether a parent or guardian can agree, on his or her child's behalf, to require arbitration of the child's claim. As properly framed, the

answer to this question should be yes based on the public policy in this Commonwealth that favors arbitration agreements to resolve disputes.

This Court has long held that public policy favors arbitration agreements. *Capecci v. Joseph Capecci, Inc.*, 139 A.2d 563, 565 (Pa. 1958) (“The public policy of this State is to give effect to arbitration agreements.”). That public policy is embodied in statutes at both the federal and state level. *See, e.g.*, Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2; 42 Pa. C.S. § 7301 *et seq.*

An arbitration agreement does not deprive parties of their cause of action or substantive rights. *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). Rather, an arbitration agreement constitutes a prospective choice of forum which “trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.” *Id.* at 628; *see also, e.g.*, *Kindred Nursing Centers v. Clark*, 581 U.S. 246, 248 (2017) (state law invalidating arbitration agreements signed by powers of attorney on others’ behalf violated FAA and did not violate right to trial by jury).

Arbitrations serve a critical role in the civil justice system by providing an efficient and economic dispute resolution option for parties

while easing the burden on the judiciary by reducing its case load substantially. Soia Mentschikoff, *The Significance of Arbitration*, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698 (1952). Indeed, arbitration agreements help assure that the business community has a more predictable, efficient, and economic mechanism to resolve disputes when they arise.

The same policy favoring arbitration agreements should hold true when parents or guardians agree that their child's claim should be resolved by arbitration rather than in the courts. Indeed, there is an even stronger basis to enforce arbitration agreements in this situation. There is a strong presumption that parents or guardians act in their child's best interest. See *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) ("[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children."). If a parent or guardian agrees on a child's behalf to arbitrate his or her claims, that decision is entitled to deference and should not be disturbed.

Thus, if an agreement to arbitrate otherwise is enforceable and the claim is within the scope of the agreement, see *Saltzman v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., Inc.*, 166 A. 3d 465, 472 (Pa. Super. 2017), there is no meaningful reason the courts should disavow it merely because a

parent or guardian made a decision for their child to submit claims to arbitration instead of the courts.

Although this Court has yet to weigh in, courts of last resort in other states addressing this issue uniformly agree that a parent or guardian has the authority to sign an arbitration agreement on behalf of their child, and the courts are duty bound to enforce the agreement. *See, e.g., Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park*, 901 A.2d 381 (N.J. 2006); *Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea*, 908 So.2d 392, 405 (Fla. 2005); *Cross v. Carnes*, 724 N.E.2d 828, 836 (Oh. Ct. App. 1998); *Doyle v. Giuliucci*, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965); *Leong ex rel. Leong v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps.*, 788 P.2d 164, 166 (Haw. 1990).

The reasoning of the highest courts in New Jersey, Ohio, Florida, California, and Hawaii is sound. The decisions strike an appropriate balance that fosters the public policy in favor of arbitrations, enforces arbitration agreements, honors the choices of parents or guardians acting on behalf of their children, and expressly preserves a minor's right to pursue his or her claim. The Court should allow an appeal and bring Pennsylvania in line with other states on this important issue.

B. The panel erred when it declined to enforce the arbitration agreement in this case.

Notwithstanding the case law, the panel held that a parent or guardian has no authority to bind a minor child to an arbitration agreement even if the parent or guardian consents and even if the dispute falls squarely within the scope of the arbitration agreement. That decision should not stand.

1. The panel's decision erodes the policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.

The panel's decision is fundamentally at odds with public policy that favors arbitration. Indeed, there is no dispute that the agreement here unambiguously applies to personal injury claims of minors whose parents consented to arbitration and voluntarily attended the Sky Zone trampoline parks. The panel here reached for reasons to render the agreement unenforceable. But that is incorrect. The courts are duty bound to enforce arbitration agreements, not seek reasons to set them aside. *Provenzano v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp.*, 121 A.3d 1085, 1097-98 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2. The panel's decision puts Pennsylvania at odds with other states on this important issue.

The panel departed from the rationale of other states despite their resolution of the precise question involved here. Whereas the decisions of other courts struck an appropriate balance of competing public policies, the panel's decision here dishonors the agreements signed by parents or guardians on their children's behalf to arbitrate claims and dishonors the presumption in favor of parents or guardians acting in their child's best interests. The Court should allow an appeal to review the panel's decision in light of the reasoning of other courts of last resort resolving the issue in a different way.

3. The panel's decision rests on a flawed premise that agreeing to arbitrate a minor's claim is the same as waiving the minor's claim.

Most critically, the panel's decision rests on a flawed premise that arbitration (rather than litigation in court) somehow deprives a minor child of his or her claim. As the courts in *Hojnowski*, *Cross*, and *Shea* confirm, there is a critical distinction between waiving a child's claim *versus* selecting a forum to resolve the claim. *Hojnowski*, 901 A.2d at 384; *Shea*, 908 So.2d at 405; *Cross*, 724 N.E.2d at 836.

The panel rejected this critical distinction. In turn, the panel's rationale suggests that the courts are the only appropriate forum to resolve a minor's claim when disputes arise; otherwise, the minor has waived the claim itself. That conclusion cannot stand. There are many important matters affecting minors resolved outside the courts, such as (for example) certain aspects of a child's public education, public healthcare availability, insurance coverage matters, or other matters left to the administrative agencies to resolve. If the state can determine that some matters involving children may be adjudicated in administrative agencies, then surely a parent or guardian may agree to have his or her child submit claims to arbitration.

The notion that the court is the only proper place in which a minor's rights may be adjudicated lest the claim be waived is manifestly incorrect and should be reviewed by this Court.

4. The panel overstepped its role by creating an exception to arbitration for minors.

In addition, the panel's decision creates a presumption against – if not a total exception to – arbitration of a minor's claim and calls into question any arbitration agreement in the Commonwealth that may

involve resolution of a minor's claim. In this way, the panel overstepped its role as a court of error-correction.

This Court has long recognized that the political branches of government set policy in the state, not the courts. *See, e.g., Martin v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review*, 466 A.2d 107, 111-13 (Pa. 1963) (“[C]ourts must take great care in wading deeply into questions of social and economic policy, which we long have recognized as fitting poorly with the judiciary's institutional competencies.”).

The General Assembly has not exercised the prerogative to prohibit arbitration of a minor's claims. If the legislature has not carved out an exception to arbitration for minors, a panel of an intermediate appellate court – as a court of error-correction – lacks the authority to do so.

5. The panel's decision engenders significant concerns for *amici* and the business community.

As a practical matter, the panel's decision has the potential to affect the enforceability of numerous arbitration agreements throughout the Commonwealth. In particular, the panel's decision calls into question arbitration agreements that public, private, and non-profit entities use when offering sporting, recreational, educational, and other activities where certain physical risks may exist. If arbitration is unavailable to

resolve disputes that may arise during these activities, these entities may be unwilling or unable to provide children with many opportunities to engage in these types of fulfilling and essential activities.

In the case of Get Air, for example, the company relies on its agreements with patrons who attend the parks to fully inform adults and children alike of the physical nature of activities involved and to seek their consent and agreement to various terms before voluntarily attending, including an agreement to select arbitration in the event incidents arise.

Without the ability to resolve claims by arbitration, companies like Get Air or other member companies of the Associations engaged in the business of offering goods or services to children may lose the benefit of arbitration. They may find themselves in multiple, years-long proceedings before the courts resolving claims of minors when arbitration could have resolved those claims in a fair and economical way for all parties in only a fraction of the time to the benefit of all parties involved.

C. The panel's decision may disincentivize business investment in the Commonwealth.

Finally, Get Air and the member companies of the Associations are multi-state and multinational employers who invest capital in the

Commonwealth based in substantial part on the certainty and predictability of statutes, regulations, and case law that affect their business. If left to stand, the panel's decision will remove the uniformity, predictability, and certainty embodied in the public policy favoring arbitration agreements on which businesses place great value when they decide whether and in which states they will invest their capital.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court should allow an appeal.

April 20, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

GA BIBIKOS LLC

/s George A. Bibikos

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this filing complies with the provisions of the *Public Access Policy of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania: Case Records of the Appellate and Trial Courts* that require filing confidential information and documents differently than non-confidential information and documents.

/s George A. Bibikos

George A. Bibikos

WORD-COUNT CERTIFICATION

In accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 531(b)(3), I certify that the attached contains 2,248 words, excluding the portions identified in the rules that do not count towards the word limitation, as calculated by the word-count feature of Microsoft Word.

/s George A. Bibikos
George A. Bibikos

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this day I caused a copy of the foregoing to be served on the parties via PACFile, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 121.

/s George A. Bibikos

George A. Bibikos

TAB “C” – PROPOSED ORDER

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Jennifer Santiago and Samuel
Santiago,

Respondents,

vs.

Philly Trampoline Park, LLC, I/P/A
Sky Zone, D/B/A Sky Zone
Trampoline Park D/B/A Sky Zone
Philadelphia, Sky Zone Philadelphia,
Inc., Sky Zone Trampoline Park
A/K/A/ Sky Zone Philadelphia,

Petitioners.

No. ____

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

ORDER

AND NOW, this __ day of _____, 2023, upon consideration of the application filed by Get Air Management, Inc. (“Get Air”); the Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform (“Coalition”); the Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association (“PMA”); and the National Federation of Independent Business, Inc. (“NFIB”) for leave to submit the attached brief of *amicus curiae* in support of a petition for allowance of appeal filed by the Sky Zone petitioners in the above captioned matter, the application is granted. *Amici* are granted leave to submit the brief attached at Tab “B” of its application. The brief shall be deemed filed as of April 20, 2023.

J.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this filing complies with the provisions of the *Public Access Policy of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania: Case Records of the Appellate and Trial Courts* that require filing confidential information and documents differently than non-confidential information and documents.

/s George A. Bibikos

George A. Bibikos

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this day I caused a copy of the foregoing to be served on all counsel of record for all parties via PACFile, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 121.

/s George A. Bibikos
George A. Bibikos
Counsel for Amici